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Berkeley’s Theodicy in A Treatise Concerning 
the Principles of Human Knowledge (1710)*
“[…] For, after all, what deserves the first place in our studies 
is the consideration of GOD and our duty;”
G. Berkeley, A Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge, §1561. 
The term ‘‘theodicy’, as it was used by G. W. Leibniz, who introduced it in 
his Essais de théodicée sur la bonté de dieu, la liberté de l’homme, et l’origine du 
mal in 1710, literally meant ‘justice of God’. It has since, however, acquired 
a more complex meaning. According to the Dictionary of the History of Ideas, 
in a narrow sense it means (i) “the defense of God, the supreme creator, ruler, 
and judge of the universe, against charges brought about by a consideration 
of both moral and natural evil”2; (ii) “a kind of  science, as it were, namely 
the doctrine of  the justice of God–that is, of his wisdom together with his 
 * This research has been funded by the National Science Centre in Poland as part of the post-
doctoral internship based on decision DEC-2014/12/S/HS1/00153. 
 1 G. Berkeley, A Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge, [PHK], The Works 
of George Berkeley ed. A. A. Luce and T. E. Jessop (9 vols.; London–Edinburgh–Paris–Mel-
bourne–Toronto–New York: Thomas Nelson and Sons Ltd., 1948–1957), vol. 2, p. 113. 
 2 L. L. Loemker, Theodicy, [in:] The Dictionary of the History of Ideas, ed. P. Wiener, 4 vols. 




goodness”3, and (iii) philosophical theology. For the purpose of this paper, 
theodicy will be considered in its second meaning, which was also accepted 
by Leibniz.  
The first edition of A Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Know-
ledge (later referred to as Principles) by George Berkeley appeared in 1710. 
The philosopher explained the aim of it in his letter to Sir John Percival. It was 
connected with his earlier work, i.e. An Essay Towards a New Theory of Vision 
(1709). Berkeley hoped to make its content subordinate to the ends of mora-
lity and religion and persuade the reader to focus their studies on the two are-
as. In Principles he wanted to demonstrate the existence and attributes of God 
and the immortality of the soul, as well as to reconcile God’s foreknowledge 
with the freedom of men4. The full title of the work, i.e. A Treatise Concerning 
the Principles of  Human Knowledge wherein the Chief Causes of  Error and 
Difficulty in the Sciences, with the Grounds of Scepticism, Atheism, and Irreli-
gion, are inquired into, as well as paragraph 4 of the Introduction section, and 
the paragraph 156 of the main text agree with the aims outlined in the letter. 
However, the problem of the reconciliation of God’s foreknowledge with the 
freedom of men is not discussed in the Principles directly. 
The analysis of the mentioned paragraphs reveals Berkeley’s assumptions 
of God’s presence in the world and goodness of His creation. They serve as the 
grounds which enable “[…] to suspect that those lets and difficulties, which 
stay and embarrass the mind in its search after truth, do not spring from any 
darkness and intricacy in the objects, or natural defect in the understanding, 
so much as from false principles which have been insisted on, and might 
have been avoided”5. It seems thus that what is responsible for the wrong way 
of reasoning is not the object itself, but the free will which man is gifted by 
God. What seems to be problematic in the light of the gift is the limit of it. 
Why does God allow man to use false principles which distance them from 
God and their duty of practicing the truths of the Gospel, which is the highest 
perfection of human nature? Can evil in its metaphysical, physical and mo-
ral sense be considered as a sign of God’s presence in the world? Those qu-
estions are to be considered in this paper. In the course of the analysis of the 
Principles, I  shall try to reconstruct Berkeley’s views on  the nature of God 
 3 L. L. Loemker, Theodicy, … p. 379. 
 4 G. Berkeley, Letter to Sir John Percival, March 1710, [in:] The Works of George Berkeley, 
vol. 8, p. 31. 
 5 [PHK] Introduction, §4, vol. 2, p. 26. 
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and his Providence, as well as the problem of evil and the meaning of justice. 
The purpose of  the analysis is  to show Berkeley’s concern for the problem 
which was discussed at the time, as well as to present his own solution to it. 
1. The nature of God and His Providence
Throughout the Principles God is  referred to by Berkeley with the use 
of  different terms, i.e. Spirit, Mind, Creator, superior or active principle, 
Agent, Author, Author of nature. The choice of terminology stresses the cha-
racter of the being of God, which is different from that of ideas. As Berkeley 
explains in a general definition of a spirit, which refers both to the finite spi-
rits of men and the infinite and uncreated spirit of God, “[…] the words will, 
[understanding, mind], soul, spirit, do not stand for different ideas, or in truth, 
for any idea at all, but for something which is very different from ideas, and 
which, being an agent, cannot be like unto, or represented by, any idea what-
soever”6. In the light of the thesis of esse est percipi God is a spirit, an incorpo-
real active substance because he is active, i.e. he thinks, wills, and perceives7. 
The words: Creator and Author indicate the relation of dependence between 
God and ideas – it is the spirit that is solely responsible for their existence8. 
In comparison to the finite spirits of men, the spirit of God is characterized 
by the following adjectives which inform us about his attributes: governing9, 
supreme10, free11, all-sufficient12, all-wise13, omnipotent14, Almighty15, as well 
as “one, eternal, infinitely wise, good, and perfect. He is described as the one 
‘who works all in all,’ and ‘by whom all things consist,’”16 “[…] who fashions, 
regulates and sustains the whole system of beings,”17 and above all “[…] who 
is intimately present to our minds, producing in them all that variety of ide-
as or sensations which continually affect us, on whom we have an absolute 
 6 PHK, §27, p. 53. 
 7 See: PHK, §138, p. 104; PHK, §139, p. 104–105.
 8 See: PHK, §29, p. 53; PHK, §146, p. 107–108.
 9 See: PHK, §32, p. 54; PHK, §44, p. 59; PHK, §106, p. 91. 
 10 See: PHK, §57, p. 65; PHK, §81, p. 75. 
 11 PHK, §57, p. 65. 
 12 PHK, §74, p. 73.
 13 PHK, §151, p. 111. 
 14 PHK, §152, p. 111. 
 15 PHK, §155, p. 112. 
 16 PHK, §146, p. 108. See also: PHK, §151, p. 110–111. 
 17 PHK, §151, p. 111. 
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and entire dependence, in short „in whom we live, and move, and have our 
being”18.
It is only God’s will which is responsible for the constitution of the laws 
of nature according to Berkeley19. We know of their existence due to the per-
ception of the visible ideas which constitute, as the philosopher wrote in An 
Essay Towards a New Theory of Vision, the Language of Nature (1709) or the 
Language of the Author of Nature (1732). The language instructs us “how to 
regulate our Actions, in order to attain those things that are necessary to the 
Preservation and Well-being of our Bodies, as also to avoid whatever may 
be hurtful and destructive of them”20. The knowledge of this fact is very im-
portant, as by nature, the spirit can be perceived by the effects which it pro-
duces21. And the effects clearly indicate that “the whole creation is a work-
manship of a wise and good agent”22. It is important to stress that Berkeley 
distinguishes his view from the representationalism of  Malebranche when 
he writes that, “Not that I imagine we see God (as some will have it) by a di-
rect and immediate view – or see corporeal things, not by themselves, but by 
seeing that which represents them in the essence of God, which doctrine is, 
I must confess, to me incomprehensible23. 
For Berkeley the perception of spirits is limited to the way they are marked 
out by ideas. Man meant as an active principle, that moves, perceives and 
thinks is not directly visible in the act of perception. It is only through dif-
ferent ideas which are present to human eyes in their act of perceiving, like 
the color, size, figure or motions of a man that we can know of the existence 
of that principle of motion as Berkeley writes in paragraph 14824. A similar 
situation occurs when it comes to the perception of God. As Berkeley claims, 
“we do at all times and in all places perceive manifest tokens of the Divinity: 
every thing we see, hear, feel, or anywise perceive by sense, being a sign or 
 18 PHK, §149, p. 109. 
 19 PHK, §32, p. 54. In general, Berkeley referred to two kinds of laws of nature. In paragraph 33 
of Passive Obedience Berkeley distinguished physical laws of nature which are non-changeable 
and natural laws which obtain in the moral world and imply a duty on men. (See: G. Berkeley, 
Passive Obedience, §33, [in:] The Works of George Berkeley, vol. VI, p. 35) Here, in §32 of the 
Principles the laws of nature denote physical laws. 
 20 G. Berkeley, An Essay Towards a  New Theory of  Vision §147, [in:] The  Works of  George 
Berkeley, vol. 1, p. 231; PHK, §44, p. 151–152. 
 21 See: PHK, §27, p. 52–53. 
 22 PHK, §107, p. 88. 
 23 PHK, §148, p. 108–109. 
 24 See: PHK, §148, p. 109.
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effect of the power of God; as is our perception of those very motions which 
are produced by men”25. Since the manifestations of God are so clear, his exi-
stence cannot be more evident for Berkeley26. 
In the light of the above considerations, two questions arise. First, if the 
existence of God is the most evident, why does He allow atheism, let people 
deny their dependence on Him27, and persist in a remorseless violation of his 
Laws28? Second, what is the place, if any, for evil is such a perfect creation? 
on the one hand Berkeley’s God is more than a deistic clockmaker on the 
other – more than a theistic author of occasional miracles. The voluntaristic 
concept of God29, shared by the philosopher, allows a possibility of aberrance 
from the regularity and uniformity of  His operations. As Berkeley writes, 
“Such exceptions from the general rules of nature are proper to surprise and 
awe men into an acknowledgement of the divine being: but then they are to 
be used but seldom, otherwise there is a plain reason why they should fail 
of that effect”30. The anomalous and surprising events are, however, referred 
to in terms of some positive miracles rather than negative catastrophes. They 
are thought to have some power persuading us of the existence of God31. Nev-
ertheless, we may think of an example when the anomaly is not a miracle at 
all. Should we thus treat the resulting evil as a conscious effect of God’s in-
consistency which is an imperfection or as an unconscious side-effect of the 
uniformity of his action? If the course of nature was interrupted by a catas-
trophe, would men be ready to admit the presence of a superior agent, i.e. the 
wise, good and perfect God? 
2. The Problem of Evil and Justice
The problem of evil was broadly discussed at the time of  the publishing 
of both editions of the Principles. Leibniz’s Theodicy (1710) was published in 
parallel with the 1st edition of Berkeley’s work. The publication of the second 
edition was preceded by Alexander Pope’s four epistles of An Essay on Man 
published in 1734. Moreover, the discussion on evil was possibly influenced 
 25 PHK, §148, p. 109.
 26 See: PHK, §149, p. 109. 
 27 PHK, §149, p. 109.
 28 See: PHK, §155, p. 112. 
 29 See: PHK, §106, p. 87. 
 30 PHK, §63, p. 68. 
 31 See: PHK, §57, p. 60. 
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by some earlier works, i.e. Pierre Bayle’s Dictionnaire historique et critique 
(1697) and William King’s De Origine Mali (An Essay on the Origin of Evil) 
(1702). Berkeley was familiar with the works by King and Pope32. The study 
of the Principles proves that Berkeley was aware of the importance of the is-
sue of evil. Despite of this, rarely does the term ‘evil’ appear in the Principles. 
It is also used in different meanings there. It refers to some events resulting 
either from the course of nature or human choices which may be considered 
by us as unpleasant33. Also, it signifies “the absurd opinions and insignificant 
disputes which grow out of  the abuse of words”34, or the acceptance of  the 
existence of matter35.
According to Berkeley, evil and some particular events which may be re-
ferred to as evil cannot be identified as one thing. It is the human perspective 
which is responsible for accounting different events as evil. The reason is its 
being finite and imperfect. Here, however, Berkeley understands imperfec-
tion as something which is partial. Human prospects are finite, thus in regard 
to the infinite prospects of God they are narrow or incomplete. That influ-
ences human perception of pain or uneasiness as evil, which in fact however, 
are not evil. only they appear to be so, since, as Berkeley writes in paragraph 
153, when considered as linked with the whole system of beings, they have 
the nature of good. Hence, the nature of an idea depends on the perspective 
from which it  is looked at, and evil is a category relevant to the finite one, 
which is illusory or apparent. The line of argumentation refers to the pain and 
uneasiness resulting both from the general laws of nature and actions of finite 
and imperfect spirits.36 What is more, evil as such is considered to be “in the 
state we are in at present, […] indispensably necessary to our wellbeing”37. 
The blemishes and defects which are present in the course of nature38 do not 
deprive it of its being perfect. on the contrary, they emphasize it. What may 
seem to be a  sign of  lack of God’s hand in the course of nature stands for 
a proof of His existence and Providence in fact. The purpose of the defects 
for Berkeley is that “they make an agreeable sort of variety, and augment the 
 32 J. P. Hershbell, Berkeley and the Problem of Evil, [in:] Journal of the History of Ideas, Vol. 31, 
No. 4, (oct.–Dec., 1970), pp. 543–544. 
 33 PHK, Introduction, §20, p. 37–38. 
 34 PHK, Introduction, §23, p. 50. 
 35 PHK, §133, p. 102. 
 36 PHK, §153, p. 111–112. 
 37 PHK, §153, p. 111.
 38 PHK, §152, p. 111.
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beauty of the rest of the creation, as shades in a picture serve to set off the 
brighter and more enlightened parts”39. 
It remains problematic however, whether the above reasoning can justify 
the existence of atheism, skepticism or irreligion and the other phenomena 
which are the results of human action and may be accounted as evil from the 
perspective of mankind. If it can, then, first, there is no reason for Berkeley 
to write any treatises which have the aim of eradicating evil which results 
from the actions of finite spirits. Secondly, men are allowed to do whatever 
they want, as they can always justify their wrong actions with the help of the 
infinite perspective in which the evil they commit is a good deed. It is rather 
dubious that Berkeley would agree with such reasoning, especially with re-
gard to what he writes in paragraph 155: “[…] it is downright impossible that 
a soul pierced and enlightened with a thorough sense of the omnipresence, 
holiness, and justice of  that Almighty Spirit should persist in a remorseless 
violation of His laws”40. And the laws he refers to here are both the Natural 
Law and the Ten Commandments. 
Therefore, we could ask, why God still allows men to follow the wrong 
path. As Berkeley writes in paragraph 151 of the first edition of the Principles, 
“[…] the finger of  God is  not so conspicuous to the resolved and careless 
sinner, which gives him an opportunity to harden in his impiety and grow 
ripe for vengeance”41. We may speculate whether the answer could be the gift 
of free will which is bestowed on man. Berkeley, however, does not consider 
that issue in the Principles in an explicit way. It can only be inferred from 
what he states at the very beginning of paragraph 3 of the Introduction to the 
Principles. He writes that men owe the difficulties on the way to knowled-
ge entirely to themselves. God furnishes men with means that enable them 
the satisfaction of the knowledge which they naturally have a strong desire 
of42. Thus, it is man himself who decides about the way he uses his faculties. 
The possibility of fault may result either from the free will which is bestowed 
in man by God or the human nature which, according to the Anglican doctri-
ne, is inclined to evil unless it is subject to the law of God43.
What is the ontological status of evil according to the point of view presen-
ted by Berkeley in the Principles? Evil, as it is described in the Principles has 
 39 PHK, §152, p. 111.
 40 PHK, §155, p. 112. 
 41 PHK, §151, p. 110–111. 
 42 See: PHK, §3, p. 42. 
 43 Article IX, Of Original or Birth Sin, [in:] 39 Articles of Faith.
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no real existence. The system in the Principles, unlike Manichaeism, which 
is a heresy according to Berkeley44, is monistic. There is only one active sub-
stance, i.e. a good and wise Spirit45 that is the Author of nature. In the light 
of the Principles, evil would have to be an abstract idea, the existence of which 
is criticized by Berkeley. Thus, it can only be a general notion46. Its being is li-
mited to its functioning, which brings about the emotive purpose of language 
introduced by Berkeley in paragraph 20 of the Principles47. In that meaning, 
the notion of ‘evil’ exists as it raises some passions, excites or deters from an 
action and puts human mind in some particular disposition. 
As such, Berkeley’s view on  evil, although not discussed at large in the 
Principles, stays in opposition to the ones held by Manicheans and Socinians 
which are the object of Berkeley’s criticism on the grounds that, in both of 
them, evil was accepted as coexistent with the good48. For Berkeley, evil does 
not exist on the level of God’s creation which is good from its nature. What 
is more, on the grounds of the Principles, it is not yet characterized as a result 
of the deviated human free will. Evil, as it appears in the Principles, functions 
as a category used by finite spirits for naming the painful, unpleasant results 
of  their actions and the general laws of nature, which are good by nature. 
Berkeley however does not provide any explanation for such identification. 
Although it  seems that he accepts St. Augustine’s Privative Theory of  Evil, 
he does not explicitly admit that a painful or an unpleasant event is called 
evil because it lacks good. It seems then that Berkeley’s use of the term ‘evil’ 
“[…] is not to distinguish and identify objects of perception, but to express 
attitudes, to formulate rules, announce aims, and to guide and to control the 
practices essential to the conduct of life”49. 
 44 PHK, §154, p. 112.
 45 PHK, §7, p. 43–44.
 46 PHK, §100, p. 84. 
 47 See: PHK, Introduction §20, p. 37. 
 48 What is more, Socinians claimed that the existence of evil is incompatible with God who 
is all-knowing. See: M. Murray, Leibniz on the Problem of Evil, first published Jan 4, 1998, re-
vised Mar 16, 2005[in:] Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy: http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/
leibniz-evil/. The problem, although intended by Berkeley, was not discussed in the Principles. 
However, on the grounds of Berkeley’s denial of the existence of evil, we may suppose his criti-
cism of Socinians’ point of view, which is also shared by G. W. Leibniz in paragraph 364 of his 
Theodicy. 
 49 H. D. Aiken, The Fate of Philosophy in the Twentieth Century, The Kenyon review, Spring 
1962, quoted after P. olscamp, The moral philosophy of George Berkeley, p. 131. 
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In the light of the above remarks, it is worth considering David Berman’s 
claim that “Berkeley, however, explained only religious mysteries emotively. 
He was entirely clear that doctrines of natural theology were to be under-
stood cognitively and justified in a rigorous way”50. It would imply that evil 
could have been treated by the philosopher as a religious mystery. Berkeley 
believes, as Berman writes, that Christian mysteries are the best ways of evo-
king the desirable attitude of respect and the feeling of love towards God51. 
Since evil may turn out to be good in the wider perspective, we should need 
no better encouragement to believe God being all-knowing as well as all-wi-
se. In addition to this, we should trust His laws, even when the obedience to 
them means facing the risk of the loss of life52. 
* * *
Throughout the Principles neither does Berkeley define nor explain what 
evil is. The explanation of the lack of either is given in paragraph 100 where 
the philosopher writes about the uselessness of abstract ideas with regard to 
morality. It was considered by him to be the most useful part of knowledge, 
yet practical and not theoretical in character. In the philosopher’s opinion 
“[…] a man may be just and virtuous without having precise ideas of justi-
ce and virtue. The opinion that those and the like words stand for general 
notions, abstracted from all particular persons and actions, seems to have 
rendered morality [very]53 difficult, and the study thereof of <small>54 use to 
mankind”55. The quoted words may serve as a justification for Berkeley not 
taking up the problem of justice as well. 
Are we then justified in our search for theodicy on the grounds of Berke-
ley’s Principles in the way it was understood by Leibniz? Berkeley’s intention 
in the Principles was to inspire the reader with the sense of God’s presence in 
the world. In the closing paragraph of the work Berkeley writes, “For, after 
 50 D. Berman, George Berkeley, [in:] British Philosophy and the Age of  Enlightenment, ed. 
S. Brown, (Taylor & Francis e-Library, 2004), vol. 5 of Routledge History of Philosophy, ed. by 
G. H. r. Parkinson and S. G. Shanker, (10 vols., London, New York: routledge, Taylor & Fran-
cis Group 1993–1999), p. 114.
 51 See: D. Berman, George Berkeley, pp. 114–115. 
 52 The problem is broadly discussed in Passive Obedience (1712). 
 53 The word was omitted in the 2nd edition of the Principles. 
 54 The word was replaced with: ‘less’ in the 2nd edition of the Principles. 
 55 PHK, §100, p. 84–85. 
158
MArTA SzYMAńSKA-LEWoSzEWSKA
all, what deserves the first place in our studies is  the consideration of God 
and our duty; which to promote, as it was the main drift and design of my 
labours […]”56. It seems thus, that the sense of Berkeley’s theodicy is not so 
much the apology of God’s presence in the world and his constant care for 
man but rather a discipline the subject of which is the analysis of the existen-
ce as well as the nature of God57. The order of the world persuades us enough 
of God’s authorship of it, as He alone is the immediate efficient cause of all 
things58. As Berkeley often repeats the words of St. Paul (Acts 17:28), it is God 
“in whom we live, move and have our being”59. It is then sufficient for him to 
conclude in paragraph 107, that 
considering the whole creation is the workmanship of a wise and good Agent, 
it should seem to become philosophers to employ their thoughts (contrary to 
what some hold) about the final causes of things; [for besides that this would 
prove a very pleasing entertainment to the mind, it might be of great advantage 
in that it not only discovers to us the attributes of  the Creator but may also 
divert us in several instances to the proper uses and applications of things]60. 
The part of paragraph 107 in square brackets which was deleted in the se-
cond edition of the Principles enhances the real purpose of the work. It is not 
to criticize human wrongdoing but to show the reason for it which lies not in 
their nature but in the wrong use of the human faculties. This also justifies the 
attention which Berkeley pays to the esse est percipi thesis and the immate-
rialist consequences of it. The optics of looking at the world as God’s creation 
through the prism of the final causes justifies the nature of reflection upon 
evil in the Principles. It focuses more on the role of evil in human life than 
on its ontological status which is nonexistent, since evil, as a general notion, 
seems to function only on the level of human language. Pain and uneasiness 
which are identified with evil contain some information given by God, the 
 56 PHK, §156, p. 113.
 57 As it turns out, the demonstration of the existence of God is impossible. The general laws 
of nature which inform us of the God’s operation in the world enable only deduction as the 
uniformity of God’s operation are only supposed and not known evidently. See: PHK, §107, 
p. 92.
 58 See: PHK, §53, p. 63.
 59 Acts, 17:28.
 60 PHK, §107, p. 88. 
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deciphering of which is our duty61. Berkeley reminds us of  it in paragraph 
109, where he writes that, 
We should propose to ourselves nobler views, namely, to recreate and exalt the 
mind with a prospect of the beauty, order, extent, and variety of natural things: 
hence, by proper inferences, to enlarge our notions of the grandeur, wisdom, 
and beneficence of the Creator; and lastly, to make the several parts of the cre-
ation, so far as in us lies, subservient to the ends they were designed for, God’s 
glory, and the sustentation and comfort of ourselves and fellow-creatures62.
In the light of above remarks, the following words of Austin Farrer, the 
author of the editor’s introduction to Leibniz’s Theodicy do not quite seem to 
be just. Farrer claims that both philosophers are similar but different at the 
same time. In general, they are authors of peculiar philosophies. on the other 
hand, however, they are not comparable as far as being consequent in their 
method of  philosophizing is  concerned. “About many things,” Farrer says, 
“Berkeley never took the trouble to Berkeleianize. To take the most surpri-
sing instance of his neglect – he assured the world that his whole doctrine 
pointed to, and hung upon, theology. But what sort of a theology? He scarcely 
took the first steps in the formulation of it. He preferred to keep on defending 
and explaining his esse est percipi. With Leibniz it is wholly different; he car-
ries his new torch into every corner, to illuminate the dark questions”63. 
Berkeley’s defense and explanation of  esse est percipi served the theolo-
gical problems which the philosopher did consider in his works where the 
study of God always remained the central one. However, with the expulsion 
of matter out of nature64, which is the view that Leibniz himself agreed with 
although he considered it to have been too paradoxically expressed by Ber-
keley65, Berkeley seemed to believe to encounter no dark questions in need 
of being illuminated so much. At least in the time of writing the first edition 
 61 See: PHK, §65, p. 69. 
 62 PHK, §109, p. 89.
 63 A. Farrer, Editor’s Introduction, [in:] W. Leibniz, Theodicy, Essays on the Goodness of God, 
the Freedom of Man and the Origin of Evil, routledge & Kegan Paul Limited, London 1951, 
The  Project Gutenberg EBook, November, 24, 2005, p.  11. http://www.gutenberg.org/
files/17147/17147-h/17147-h.htm
 64 PHK, §96, p. 82.
 65 Leibniz expressed that view in a note written on the last page of the copy of Berkeley’s Prin-
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of Principles, the philosopher seemed to think that the excess of light might 
have had a blinding power.
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Abstract
Berkeley’s Theodicy in A Treatise Concerning the Principles  
of Human Knowledge (1710)
In this article I attempt to reconstruct Berkeley’s views on the nature of God and his 
Providence, as well as the way he refers to the problem of evil and justice in the world. 
My analysis is based on one of the early works by Berkeley, i.e. Principles of Human 
Knowledge (1710). Its aim is  to present Berkeley’s understanding of  theodicy as 
different from the one suggested by Leibniz in Theodicy (1710).
Key words: Berkeley, God, evil, theodicy, justice
